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Abstract 
In 1997 Rwanda introduced a re-settlement policy for refugees displaced during previous 
conflicts. We exploit geographic variation in the speed of implementation of this policy to 
investigate the impact of conflict-induced displacement and the re-settlement policy on 
household agricultural output and on skill spill-over mechanisms between returnees and 
stayers. We find that returns to on-farm labour are higher for returnees relative to stayers, 
although the evidence suggests that the policy contributed little additional effect to this 
differential. More speculatively, these differentials suggest that, upon return from conflict-
induced exile, returnees are more motivated to increase their economic performance. 
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Introduction
Rwanda has experienced sustained waves of ethnic violence since 1959, which has resulted in massive
population displacements that have strained the supply for land and housing. In 1997, after the latest wave
of violence, the Rwandan government implemented a re-settlement and land redistribution policy, the
villagization or imidugudu policy, for displaced returnees. This paper studies the eﬀect of conflict-induced
displacement and of the villagization policy on the output of subsistence agricultural households in post-
conflict rural Rwanda. The villagization policy randomly targeted returnees, and we use geographic
variation in the speed of implementation of the policy to estimate the impact of the villagization policy on
returning household agricultural output and on skill spill-over mechanisms between returnees and stayers.
As the imidugudu settlements were built on the border of existing villages, we observe both stayers and
returnees living in policy and non-policy areas. Since conflict-induced displacement in Rwanda presents
an exogenous shock, the population of stayers can serve as a control group to account for potential
systematic heterogeneity across policy and non-policy areas in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis.
The motivation for using conflict-induced displacement to proxy the incidence of conflict at the house-
hold level is three-fold: conflict-induced displacement is likely to be costly in terms of human capital,
displacement in Rwanda is an exogenous shock at the household level, and, more pragmatically, displace-
ment is more easily observable in the data. First, conflict-induced displacement is likely to be costly in
terms of human capital and have a direct eﬀect on a household’s agricultural output upon return. This
eﬀect is likely to operate through diﬀerent channels. For instance, displacement status may be associated
with an exposure to a particularly high level of violence during the conflict and its resulting sociological
or psychological eﬀects. Furthermore, periods spent in camps may have some impact on the level of
agricultural skills. No assumption is made at this stage as to whether returnees have incurred a net
positive or a negative shock to their level of human capital, as while they might have lost some skills,
they might have gained new ones. Displacement is also likely to result in the "atomization" of the house-
hold, potentially reducing intergenerational agricultural skill transfers. Finally, as displaced households
are spatially "re-shuﬄed" across Rwanda, specific agricultural skills developed in their original place of
residence may not be transferable to their new place of residence. One impediment to the transfer is the
drastic diﬀerence in soil type, elevation, and the slope of the cultivated land across and within Rwandan
villages, and cultivating a specific parcel of land is likely to require specific agricultural knowledge on
the farmers’ part. Second, we argue that conflict-induced displacement in Rwanda consists of an exoge-
nous shock, as the militia operated along "war paths" within Rwanda1. This method of operation likely
1Ali (2000) outlines the idea that ethnic wars diﬀer from other types of wars in that they are rarely driven by economic
motives (Sambanis, 2000, also quoted in Ali, 2000; for specific qualitative evidence on the Rwandan case, see also Straus,
2004, and Uvin,1999). This goes to provide some credential to one of our main working assumptions, which is that, during
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led to the displacement of both non-perpetrators, who were driven from their homes, and perpetrators,
who joined the militia. Hence, by using conflict-induced displacement, we do not distinguish between
non-perpetrators and perpetrators. Although this limits our study to measuring the eﬀect of conflict
"averaged" across those two groups, it allows us to overcome any potential selection issue related to the
decision of the population of Hutus who were on the war path to join the militia or to be persecuted.2 The
third, and more pragmatic, argument to motivate using displacement as a measure of conflict incidence
is that, whereas most micro-level measures of the incidence of conflict are hard to come by in typical
household survey data, migration is often reported, hence providing a straight-forward proxy for conflict
incidence.
This study contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of civil conflicts in that it oﬀers a measure
of the cost at the household level and to the literature on the sources of civil conflicts by assessing the
existence of systematic economic disparities. The costs of conflicts, both in terms of physical and human
capital, are diﬃcult to measure, and few studies have so far attempted to provide such cost estimates
at the microeconomic level.3 Blattman (2006) provides an estimate of the long-term costs of military
participation in Northern Uganda at the individual level. However, this study’s focus on the impact of civil
strife on agricultural productivity at the household level in LDCs has not been tackled in the literature.
An impressive body of literature has recently emerged on the topic of the causes of civil conflicts, and the
linkage between peace and a country’s socioeconomic performance. Miguel et al. (2004) find a positive
correlation between economic under-performance and the likelihood of civil strife, using rain-shocks as
an instrument to establish causality.4 Using cross-sectional comparison, Collier (2003) finds supportive
evidence of a ‘conflict trap’, whereby low aggregate levels of physical as well as human capital correlate to
the likelihood of conflict resurgence. Some microeconomic studies (Deininger, 2003; Bigombe et al., 2000;
Verwimp, 2005) suggest a causal link between poverty in general, and the lack of economic prospects in
particular, and the likelihood of conflict. Based on this strand of literature, this study’s economic analysis
of a post-conflict situation and re-settlement policy becomes relevant to the assessment of the likelihood
of conflict resurgence.
This paper is structured as follows: The first section presents background historical information on
Rwanda and the villagization policy, the data and the variables of interest are described in a second
the Rwandan genocide, the militia did not select the villages they attacked on the basis of their economic performance.
However, that land scarcity may have been among the factors driving individuals to perpetrate the genocide in Rwanda
(Verwimp, 2005) is still perfectly compatible with this assumption.
2 Straus (2004) provides evidence from qualitative interviews in post-war Rwanda that the perpetrators main motivation
is "in-group, intra-Hutu coercion and intimidation".
3Cost of conflict has also been estimated at a macroeconomic level. For instance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) propose
a measure of the aggregate economic cost of the conflict in the Basque Country.
4 Some theoretical contributions also explore the causes of conflict at the microeconomic level (Caselli and Coleman,
2002; Bhavnani and Backer, 2000).
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section, selection issues are dealt with in a third section, a fourth section presents the regression analysis
results, and a fifth section concludes.
1 Background
Rwanda has experienced sustained waves of ethnic violence since independence in 1959.5 These successive
episodes of civil strife led to massive population displacements. Much of the population was stranded in
refugee camps either within the Rwandan borders or in the border countries of Burundi, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania, and Uganda.6 After the 1994 genocide, the government encouraged
all Rwandans located in refugee camps abroad to return to Rwanda. Given these diﬀerent waves of
displacement, two types of returnees are commonly defined: the Old Case Load (OCL) — refugees who
fled before 1994 — and the New Case Load (NCL) — refugees who fled as a result of the 1994 genocide
and the 1996 insurrection. The Rwandan National Oﬃce for Population (ONAPO) reports that 300,000
people fled as a result of the post-decolonization war (Bucagu, 2000). The same source estimates that
over one million pre-1994 refugees returned to Rwanda after 1994, including children and grandchildren
of the 1959 refugees.
In 1993, the Arusha Agreements specified that migrants returning to Rwanda after 10 or more years
of exile were not entitled to claim their property back. This regulation left no room for legal claims over
land on the OCL refugees’ part and oﬀered no solution to the waves of displacement triggered by the
1994 genocide. As genocide survivors and perpetrators came back to Rwanda, they often found their
land and houses occupied. As a consequence, most OCL refugees became homeless and landless, living
in plastic shelters on the roads of Rwanda. This created tensions, and in 1996, the government became
concerned that a second wave of ethnic violence would emerge.
In 1997, the government implemented a land redistribution and housing relocation programme, called
the villagization policy or imidugudu policy. This policy grouped returnees in agglomerated settlements
within existing villages, endowing them with parcels of land situated outside the settlement. The main
expected benefits of the programme were the following. First, the eﬃcient pattern of re-settlement
was hoped to reduce land-related tensions through re-settlement and land allocation for post-1994 re-
turnees. Second, it was expected that security would be enhanced by promoting more densely populated
settlements over the traditional Rwandan villages.7 Third, it was hoped that, thus re-settled, the re-
5For an outline of the Rwandan political and historical background, as well as a detailed account of those episodes of
violence (comparatively analysed to the Burundian context), see Uvin (1999).
6 Some estimations suggest that half of the population was thereby displaced, either temporarily or for longer periods of
time (Bucagu, 2000).
7 It was hoped that militia men, normally operating in small units, would hence be deterred from attacking larger groups
of villagers.
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turnees would have recourse to more mechanised means of production, which would enhance productivity
at the farm-level through agglomeration externalities. Finally, a more clustered pattern of settlement
when coupled with access to public goods, such as an agricultural extension services (AES)8, could be
productivity-enhancing both by facilitating access to this infrastructure and by making the use of tools
more profitable when shared by several households.
The initial coverage of the policy was not universal, and, in 2000/01, both programme and non-
programme areas were observed (Table 1). Although it was expected that, in the longer run, the pro-
gramme would be extended to the whole of Rwanda, it initially only oﬀered a solution to NCL and OCL
refugees who re-settled within the pilot areas of the programme after 1994. Although there is no evidence
that any sort of selection took place in the sorting of returnees across imidugudu and non-policy villages
(RISD9, 1999), we dedicate a section to testing for any systematic correlation between (observable) house-
hold and village characteristics and policy status. The pilot implementation of the programme partly
targeted the less densely populated prefectures. That voluntarily re-settlement of returnees within those
areas would occur was not obvious, due the war trauma endured and the fear of higher insecurity in these
areas. For instance, Ruhengeri, strategically located on the border with the DRC, was highly targeted by
the militias during the conflict and a scene of intense displacement. Thus, it was relatively less densely
populated and richer in land in 1996. Similarly, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kigali rural, and Umutara were, as
a result of the conflict, less densely populated and thus more suitable to accommodate the imidugudu
villages.
Some of the potential drawbacks of the villagization policy as it was implemented in Rwanda include
increasing the distance to the farm land, not integrating the settlements into existing villages, and re-
stricting the policy to post-1994 returnees. Increasing the distance between producers’ house and their
land parcels could lower agricultural productivity, as farmers might be reluctant to cultivate areas that
could not be watched closely and are thus vulnerable to theft or sabotage (Andre, 1998).10 Second, by
reducing the integration of the returnee population living in policy areas with the rest of the community,
the policy might prevent skill spill-over mechanisms to operate between stayers and returnees in policy
8An agricultural extension service is a cooperative in charge of improving cultivation techniques, mainly by providing
seeds and tools, or by helping farmers with parcel management. Those infrastructures do not have full coverage in Rwanda,
but are located both in policy and non-policy areas. Although we cannot be sure that those infrastructures were randomly
distributed, we find no appreciable diﬀerences in observed village characteristics across villages with access to an AES and
those without (not reported). We control for such infrastructure by adding a dummy for access to AES within the village
in subsequent regression analysis.
9RISD stands for Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable Development.
10We control for distance to field in all subsequent regressions, but fail to reject the null of individual insignificance for
that covariate (coeﬃcient not reported).
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areas11 , and/or yield negative sociological pressures, hence creating a ‘ghetto eﬀect’.12 . In addition, the
majority of imidugudu settlers are OCL returnees, and hence likely to be mainly Tutsis. Should ethnic
tensions be ongoing, this could condition their integration with stayers (mainly Hutus), and security may
become more precarious. Moreover, skill spill-overs across returnees and stayers may not occur at all.
The threat of renewed ethnic tensions could in turn harm agricultural production, by inducing households
to under-cultivate their land.13
2 Data
The study uses two data sources: the 2000/01 National Rwandan EICV, which surveyed over 6400
households across all twelve Rwandan prefectures, and the Community Survey, which was carried out
in the same villages and at the same time as the EICV, and contains pre- and post-1994 village-level
characteristics. The EICV questionnaire consists of twelve sections, some at the individual level and
some at the household level, providing a comprehensive set of variables regarding employment, education,
migration, agricultural production, and consumption. The data contain no record of ethnicity. Both rural
and urban households were surveyed in all prefectures: 5271 households were visited in rural areas and
1149 in urban areas. Given that we are interested in agricultural productivity at the household level, we
exclude both urban households and rural households who do not engage in agriculture. This reduces our
sample, after removing outliers14 , to some 4900 households, spread out evenly15 across the eleven rural
Rwandan prefectures. The sampling procedure designed by the World Bank (Scott, 1997) encompassed
440 rural villages across the prefectures.16 The survey collectors undertook a population census of the
population in each enumeration area (or village)17; and then the households surveyed were randomly
drawn from these lists. Since most returnees re-settled in Rwanda between 1995 and 1998, the date
of the data collection (2000/01) presents a limitation on the assessment of the human capital cost of
displacement. However, we argue that, if anything, our estimates are a conservative measure of the cost
11The idea of skill-spillovers being influenced by patterns of settlement in a rural setting can be linked to the literature
on technical change and skill spill-overs in rural areas (cf. Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2000).
12Our discussion of the potential ‘ghetto eﬀects’ induced by the imidugudu settlements is, in spirit, very similar to that
proposed by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) on the potential channels through which segregation might aﬀect the socioeconomic
outcomes of Blacks in the US .
13 Indeed, when introducing uncertainty on yield, or unenforced property rights, in a simple producer programme, one
can easily derive that agents would invest less in their production and save more than in a world without risk, other things
equal.
14This concerns all observations that declared aberrant values for prices of crops, produced quantities with respect to the
available size of land declared, and amounts transferred or received. In total, we trim out less than 30 households.
15 Indeed, each prefecture represents between 8.08% and 9.56% of the sample.
16The entity we refer to as "village" is the enumeration area of the data, which refers to actual villages in rural areas.
17There is however no indication as to whether migrants living in precarious shelters are included in the sample or not.
5
of conflict.18
2.1 Agricultural output
Because of the predominance of subsistence agriculture, Rwandan households are mostly multiple-crop
producers. Hence, restricting the analysis to only one type of crop would yield selection issues. The
2000/01 EICV surveyed the quantity and value of the annual harvest for each crop produced by the
household.19 We do not observe prices at the village or national level.20 Relying on the prices declared
by households in survey data is not without risk, as they might be mis-reported.21 Hence, we choose to
aggregate the reported prices at the prefecture level.22 Indeed, this should allow for lower levels of error,
should the measurement error component be well-behaved white noise. We use the median value of the
reported price (for each crop) at the municipality level.23
The mean of annual agricultural production per adult estimated in this study is 11 810 Rwandan
Francs (approximately US$36), and the median value is 16 900 Rwandan Francs (or US$51). Figure 1
presents (unconditional) kernel density estimates of the distribution of agricultural household output by
displacement and policy status. Few disparities exist between stayers in policy and non-policy areas.
If anything, stayers in policy areas seem to be doing better than those in non-programme villages, but
dispersion is similar across areas. However, on the right-hand side of Figure 1, there are obvious diﬀerences
in the distribution of agricultural production between post-1994 migrants in policy and non-policy areas.
Migrants living in villages where imidugudu were built experience higher levels of output per adult
18 Indeed, should displacement be associated to lower levels of human capital, then positive skill spill-overs mechanisms
from stayers to returnees from 1998 and 2001 would lead us to estimate a less negative value of the treatment. Similarly,
should displacement translate into higher levels of human capital, then positive skill spill-overs from returnees to stayers
would also bias our measure of the treatment eﬀect towards zero.
19The issue of a common unit of measure is also a challenge. In this survey, the price reported was per unit produced
of the corresponding crop, and each household could select from a range of units of measure. We however find that there
seems to be a consensus in the unit used by crop type, as the amount of variation in the choice of unit within-crop is very
low. Hence we choose to ignore this issue and consider that all households within a same municipality refer to the same
unit of measure.
20 Shadow price estimation, which relies on a profit maximisation framework to induce the real price level in equilibrium,
would ideally be used to retrieve the value of the household production. However, the outside option for the representative
household member’s labour supply decision is virtually non-existent in most villages and prefectures, as a very low proportion
of households are observed in paid employment. A direct implication is that wages are typically unobserved at a village or
even prefecture level, rendering the identification of nominative crop prices at a suﬃciently disaggregate level unlikely.
21 In the case of rare crops, the number of price observations is very low; hence we base our analysis on the 30 most
produced crops only.
22Deaton (1997) argues that prices are likely to be correlated at the village level, due to neighbourhood eﬀects, such as
homogeneity in land quality. Hence, choosing the village level as the unit of aggregation would seem a reasonable compromise.
However, comparing households’ price estimation at the village level, striking disparities are observed in commodity prices
within a village, which seems unlikely to reflect the real level of prices. Comparing values within prefectures reduces the
dispersion and, where there are few observations within a village, potentially reduces the incidence of measurement error.
For instance, for the most produced crop, sorghum, the standard deviation is reduced by 10% when using prefecture level
relative to village level aggregation.
23As outlined by Capeau and Dercon (2006), using the mean value of the reported price would tend to give too much
weight to outliers. Opting for the median hence seems a more attractive option. Moreover, this allows us to partly overcome
the issue of heterogeneity in the unit of measure, as these observations are likely to be treated as outliers.
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than those living in other places. Moreover, most of the variation is located at the lower tail of the
distribution of output, suggesting that the policy had a particularly strong eﬀect on those returnees
producing relatively low levels of output. This suggests that measuring the eﬀect of the policy at the
quantiles of the distribution of output, rather the mean, in the subsequent regression analysis might allow
for more appropriate values of the treatment eﬀect to be computed.
2.2 Policy variable
The main question in the Community Survey on the villagization policy is: "Has the commune built
imidugudu since 1994, and, if yes, how many, and which were the two main sources of financing?".
The information about the number of imidugudu in the village is often not exploitable as 40% of the
answers were ‘do not know’, the number of houses contained in each of these imidugudu is unobserved,
and the information on which body funded the construction work is not detailed enough to allow precise
analysis.24 Consequently, we rely on a single village-level dummy variable for the presence of imidugudu
to assess the policy at the household level (Table 1). The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework we use
allows us to estimate the treatment eﬀect that corresponds to an ‘intent-to-treat’ eﬀect, as all post-1994
returnees living in villages where imidugudu were built could expect to be included in the programme.25
2.3 Conflict-induced displacement
The survey has information on migration status, place of previous residence, the date of arrival in the
current residence, the period of time spent in the previous residence and the occupation while there,
and the main reason for migrating to the current residence for all household members over 15.26 That
only information related to the most recent migration was surveyed presents a limitation in precisely
identifying diﬀerent waves of post-1994 migration. Moreover, only the date of return and the reason
for return are surveyed. No information was recorded with regard to out-migrations, i.e. potentially
conflict-induced displacements. One implication is that we do not observe the returnees’ municipality of
residence before displacement occurred. The clustered pattern of departures in 1994 and in the 1970s
suggests that most migrations that occurred after 1994 correspond to returns from conflict-induced exiles
(Figure 2).27 As we can identify the date of out-migration, we could theoretically discriminate between
OCL and NCL refugees. However, most OCL refugees who returned to Rwanda after 1994 were the
24The reported answers to this question where (percentage quoted as first main source/percentage quoted as sec-
ond main source) : voluntary contributions (64%/32%), association of nationals (5%/12%), government (1%/7%),
NGOs/International organisations (30%/49%).
25This is, in spirit, similar to the identification strategy used by Edin et al. (2003) and Field (2002).
26Migration status refers here to the answer to the question: "Have you ever lived in another residence for more than one
month?".
27The date of departure is input as the reported date of arrival in current residence minus the time (in years) spent in
the previous residence.
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children or grandchildren of those who fled ethnic persecutions in the late fifties and early sixties. Hence,
it is not clear whether the years spent abroad are precise enough to infer what type of returnees each
household member belongs to. Around 60.7% of returnees spent between 0 and 5 years in their previous
residence, which would indicate they belong to the NCL refugees. The frequency of out-migration by year
across policy and non-policy areas (Figure 2) provides results in line with historical facts, as it shows two
peaks in the distribution, one in 1994, and one around 1975. The peak around the mid-seventies suggests
that the post-1994 OCL returnees were mainly children of those who fled Rwanda in 1959 and were often
born in exile, where the mode of the year of birth was 1975. The high frequency of out-migration in 1994
corroborates that, as the genocide started, massive and sudden displacements of population occurred.28
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis
In this study, we exploit geographic variation in the speed of implementation of the villagization policy to
estimate the eﬀect of displacement and of the policy on the displaced, as well as diﬀerentials in returns to
inputs across groups, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis. Let P be the policy status variable, where
P takes the value 1 if a household is included in the programme, and 0 if not. Let Qm(P ) = Qm(1) be the
agricultural output of a given household living in a policy area, and Qm(P ) = Qm(0) its level of output
had it not benefited from the programme, for a given a displacement status m ∈ {returnee; stayer}.
A household potential agricultural yield is also conditional on a set of observable characteristics, X.
Allowing for the (implicit) production function, GmP (.), to vary across returnees and stayers and also
across policy regimes, Qm(1) and Qm(0) can be written as:
⎧
⎨
⎩
Qm(1) = Gm1 (X)
Qm(0) = Gm0 (X),∀m ∈ {returnee; stayer}.
(1)
Assume that returning households self-select into the programme on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis
of their potential gain from the programme. Given their utility function U(.), and assuming that there is
no cost associated with choosing policy status P , a returning household chooses its policy status solely
based on its expected agricultural output, as follows:29
P = 1{E[U(Qreturnee(1))− U(Qreturnee(0))|X] ≥ 0}. (2)
28Kondylis (2007) also finds that the patterns of returns in time is analogous across policy and non-policy areas.
29The indicator function 11(z) is equal to 1 if z is true, and 0 otherwise.
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It then follows that, controlling for X, the choice of benefiting from the policy will be independent
of the household potential earnings. We allow for variations in the implicit agricultural production
function across groups by interacting dummies for displacement status, policy status, and an interaction
dummy between displacement and policy status, with production inputs. The impact of displacement on
agricultural output for a given policy status P is:
E(∆QreturneeP |X)−E(∆QstayerP |X).
The pure policy impact is, other things equal, the diﬀerence of the diﬀerences in output between returnees
and stayers across policy and non-policy areas:
E(∆Qreturnee1 −∆Q
stayer
1 |X)−E(∆Qreturnee0 −∆Qstayer0 |X).
The corresponding (true) linear regression model can be written (where Γ is a vector of regression coef-
ficients, and a white noise error term u):
Q = Γ0X + u.
Diﬀerentiating totally and taking expectations:
E(∆Q) = Γ0E(∆X).
Holding all covariates constant but one, say Xj , and denoting βj its associated true regression coeﬃcient
:
E(∆Q|{Xk}k 6=j) = E(∆Xj)βj .
Introducing subscripts and superscripts into this expression and subtracting across displacement status
we get the partial expected displacement status eﬀect:
E(∆QreturneeP −∆Q
stayer
P |Xreturnee2 , ...,XreturneeN ,Xstayer2 , ...,XstayerN )
= E(∆Xj)(β
returnee
j − β
stayer
j ),∀P ∈ {0, 1}.
Diﬀerencing this expression across policy sub-samples, we get the expected pure policy eﬀect:
E[(∆Qreturnee1 −∆Q
stayer
1 )− (∆Qreturnee0 −∆Q
stayer
0 )|Xreturnee2 , ...,XreturneeN ,Xstayer2 , ...,XstayerN ]
= E(∆X1)[(β
returnee
1 − β
stayer
1 )− (βreturnee0 − β
stayer
0 )].
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Testing whether [(βreturnee1 − β
stayer
1 ) − (βreturnee0 − β
stayer
0 )] is significantly diﬀerent from zero is then
equivalent to testing whether the policy had an impact, controlling for the displacement status ef-
fect. Implementing such diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis requires that observations be independent,
non-identically distributed (Wooldridge 2002, chap. 6) across treatment and control groups, and across
policy and non-policy areas. In this study, three sources of concern arise in assessing the impact of
the villagization programme on the population of returnees in Rwanda using such design. First, certain
households might have self-selected into displacement. Second, the government might have systematically
chosen the villages where the imidugudu were built based on some village-level characteristics. Third,
among those households who returned to Rwanda after the genocide, some might have self-selected into
programmes areas. In this section, we exploit the large array of household and village characteristics
available in the EICV to investigate their distribution across groups, so as to identify any potential
systematic correlation between observable household and village characteristics, and displacement and
policy status.
3.2 Selection into displacement
Given the nature of the Rwandan conflict, ethnicity obviously played a large part in the selection process
whereby specific households were targeted by the militia and fled Rwanda. However, we cannot account for
the role of ethnicity in this study. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that ethnicity is uncorrelated
to a person’s agricultural output, all else equal. We further contend that the nature of the conflict did
not leave much room for selection into displacement, as, when a militia group attacked a given village,
the villagers’ options were to flee or to be killed. Obviously this implies that selection might have been at
play between death and displacement, but this is not an issue we can empirically address with the existing
data. Particularly, we argue that, as genocide perpetrators targeted all Tutsis and moderate Hutus, they
did so regardless of their socioeconomic background. This case is supported by Uvin (1999), who outlines
how the victims of the genocide just happened to be "in the wrong place at the wrong time". Although
Uvin acknowledges that among other motives, economic opportunism may have driven the perpetrators
into committing killings, he argues that this is unlikely to have been a main source of motivation or have
played a large role in the selection of the victims. Straus (2004), using data from qualitative interviews
carried out in post-war Rwanda also finds that economic motives were not prevalent in the killing decision.
Nevertheless, should ethnicity and ideological belief be systematically related to some form of unobserved
heterogeneity which aﬀects expected output, then our estimates would be inappropriate.
As a check, we empirically examine potential determinants of displacement on aggregate and across
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policy status in a regression framework.30 We are limited in our analysis to selection on the basis of
observable characteristics, as we do not have access to a longitudinal data source. Table 2 presents
the results of logistic regression models at the household level, where returnee status is the dependent
variable, taking the value 1 if the head of the household is a returnee, and 0 otherwise. We estimate
the same regression model applying diverse sample restrictions: column 1 presents results on the whole
sample; in column 2, the sample is restricted to policy areas; and in column 3, the sample excludes all
policy areas. The results on the overall sample (col. 1) suggest that households with younger heads, in
partnership, with fewer children, and with a larger proportion of members born abroad are more likely
to be post-1994 returnees. These results seem to be in line with the idea that younger (and most likely
healthier) households were more likely to escape the persecutions. Comparing the estimated coeﬃcients
across policy and non-policy areas in columns 2 and 3 highlights which characteristics might explain any
sorting of returnees across policy and non-policy areas. The average age of the household is negative and
significant in non-policy areas, and insignificant in non-policy areas. However, we cannot reject parameter
constancy across samples at conventional levels. Similar observations are made for the coeﬃcients on the
proportion of children within the household and the dummy for whether the head is in a partnership.
Nevertheless, the coeﬃcients on the proportion of household members born in Rwanda is significant in
both samples, and parameter constancy cannot be accepted. Moreover, this coeﬃcient increases when
restricting the sample to policy areas, suggesting that the proportion of OCL migrants is higher in these
areas. A dummy for OCL status is included in all regression models in an attempt to control for this
potential source of systematic unobserved heterogeneity.31
3.3 Selection into the programme
The next concern is the selection of prefectures and villages into the programme. From Table 1, it is
obvious that some prefectures were more likely to be selected into the programme than others. As we
still observe a number of treated and control villages within each prefecture, controlling for prefecture
fixed-eﬀect in subsequent regression analysis should control for any unobserved heterogeneity across
prefectures that might otherwise contaminate our estimates. That villages may have been selected into
the programme on the basis either of village-level or villagers’ characteristics is of concern. As a check,
30As the urban areas are not considered in this analysis, we run the risk that the sample of migrants we base our analysis
on is a selected sample. A descriptive analysis of the observed characteristics across urban and rural groups (results not
reported) suggest that those living in the urban areas are, on average, more educated than their rural counterparts. However
this is also the case for stayers. We control for education in all subsequent regressions.
31 Splitting the sample between OCL and NCL was also attempted, although the null of parameter constancy across
samples was rejected at conventional levels. Moreover, taking the average eﬀect over all types of returnees helps avoid the
question of sorting of those displaced returning into their residence prior conflict, and of potential heterogeneity across NCL
and OCL. This is, in spirit, similar to the identification strategy used by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) to measure the average
eﬀect of racial segregation on individual time use and other socioeconomic outcome variables in the US.
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we estimate logistic regression models of policy status at the village level, conditioning on household
characteristics, and restricting the sample to stayers and pre-1997 returnees.32 The results are presented
in Table 3, columns 2 and 3. The positive and significant coeﬃcient on the proportion of children in
the sample of stayers suggests that the programme particularly targeted areas with high stayers’ fertility.
As the fertility decision might be positively correlated to output, this may reflect that high-yield areas
are more likely to be included into the programme. However, we do not observe pre-policy levels of
output and thus cannot test this assumption. Should this be the case, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences should
absorb this source of heterogeneity, allowing a consistent estimate of the policy eﬀect on returnees to be
measured. The positive and significant coeﬃcients on the dummy for female head of the household in
columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 suggest that areas with high proportions of pre-1997 returning widows were
more likely to be included in the programme.33 The impact on our measure of the impact of villagization
on agricultural productivity is unclear, and we control for widow status in all subsequent estimations.
The coeﬃcient on the dummy for OCL returnees is positive and significant coeﬃcient in the whole sample
and in the sample of stayers and pre-1997 returnees. This suggests that villages with a high proportion
of OCL returnees were more likely to be included in the imidugudu programme. As mentioned above,
we include a dummy for OCL returnees in all subsequent regression models.
3.4 Selection of returnees into programme areas
There is very little evidence that those returnees who benefited from the imidugudu programme were
selected by the programme oﬃcials on any basis (RISD, 1999) However, we address the concern that
returning households may have self-selected into displacement and programme villages. We estimate
logit regression models of policy status at the village level, restricting the sample respectively to post-
1997 returnees, and to all returnees (Table 3, cols. 4, 5). The coeﬃcient on the age of the head bears a
positive and significant coeﬃcient in the sample of all returnees (Table 3, col. 5), suggesting that being
1 year older increases the probability for returnees to re-settle in policy areas by 3.6%, all else equal. We
control for age in all subsequent regressions. However, there is little diﬀerence in the average age of all
household members. The coeﬃcient on the dummy for OCL is significant in the village level selection
equations (Table 3, cols. 1, 3). We find no disparities in the proportion of the population non-employed
in the previous residence across groups of returnees. This is reassuring in terms of potential self-selection,
either on the basis of observable or unobservable characteristics. That employment status while in
exile be comparable across returnees living in policy and non-policy areas is critical. Indeed, should sub-
32An ideal test on this selection issue would be to include some pre-policy land allocation (and quality) indicators at the
village level. However, we do not hold such information. Moreover, as the policy potentially had a direct impact on land
allocation for all groups, controlling for land allocation in 2001 would be inappropriate.
33The correlation coeﬃcient between having a woman head and having a widowed head is 0.78.
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groups have experienced diﬀerential non-employment rates then skill-depreciation and economic and social
pressure associated with conflict induced displacement would be likely to diﬀer widely across groups. We
also observe that post-1997 returnees who returned to a village where water supply was available before
1994 are 18.4% less likely to benefit from the policy than those who returned to villages without water
supply before 1994. However sample means of the provision water supply in the 2001 sample suggest that
these diﬀerences did not persist and should not influence output. Overall, those results suggest that there
was no selection into displacement, of villages into the conflict, or of returnees into programme areas on
the basis of observable characteristics.
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 Input consumption
In this subsection, we use regression analysis to outline the patterns of agricultural input consumption at
the household level by displacement and policy status. In doing so, we intend to check that there are no
systematic diﬀerences in input consumption across groups. Indeed, should there be any strong correlation
between input consumption and the treatment variables, it would suggest that displacement and policy
status are determinants of input consumption and, therefore, the identification of the treatment eﬀects
in subsequent regression analysis would be aﬀected.
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of the eﬀect of displacement, policy, and their interaction on the
consumption of agricultural inputs (land, seeds bought, on-farm labour, and adult on-farm participation
rate) at the household level. Column (1) presents the unconditional treatment eﬀects, whereas column
(2) presents the results conditional on exogenous household characteristics: household head’s age and its
square, household members’ average age, household head’s sex, a dummy for widower head, household
size, number of adults in the household, average educational attainment for members involved in farm
production and for members in charge of the production (years of education, excluding repeated years),
average distance to the household’s cultivated parcels, and OCL status. We further control for prefecture
fixed-eﬀects in column (3).
The results for land allocation are included in the first panel of the table. When no additional controls
are included (col. 1), we find that living in a policy area is associated with a significant and positive
eﬀect, and that the eﬀect is larger for returnees than for stayers by a factor of 2.5. Being a returnee in
non-policy areas, however, does not appear to have any significant impact on access to land. These eﬀects
are relatively small, corresponding to an increase in land endowment of a third of a standard deviation
for returnees in policy areas. The low R-squared (0.01) associated with this specification indicates that
policy interacted with displacement status explains very little of the sample variation. These results are
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not significantly aﬀected by the inclusion of household controls (col. 2); however, introducing prefecture
fixed-eﬀects (col. 3) washes out all of the eﬀects associated with displacement and villagization. Overall,
this suggests that spatial diﬀerences and the sorting of policy areas across prefectures account for most of
the diﬀerence in land allocation across groups. This result has the implication that land-rich prefectures
were more likely to be included in the re-settlement programme.
The second panel of Table 4 reports the results for seed consumption. The estimates of the uncondi-
tional eﬀects suggest that returnee status and policy status have a significant and positive eﬀect on seed
consumption. However, those eﬀects are relatively small, diﬀerences on the order of 9 to 31 percent of
a standard deviation, and the associated R-squared is very low. The inclusion of additional household
characteristics does not significantly aﬀect the coeﬃcients (col. 2), although the coeﬃcient on the policy
dummy is now barely significant. Adding prefecture fixed-eﬀects (col. 3) renders the coeﬃcient associated
with the returnee status dummy insignificant, but the eﬀect of living in a programme area does not vary.
Overall, these results suggest that access to seeds is enhanced in policy areas, although, given the nature
of the market for seeds, causality cannot be established on the basis of these results.
Finally, the last two panels of Table 4 contain the results for the average on-farm weekly participation
(in hours) per adult member and for the on-farm adult participation rate. Comparing the R-squared
across the specifications, it is clear that household characteristics account for most of the variations in
on-farm participation. Displacement status is associated with adults working fewer hours, in a given
week, on the household farm in columns (1) and (2). In contrast, migrants in policy areas are found, in
columns (1) and (2), to allocate more hours to on-farm production, completely oﬀ-setting the negative
eﬀect associated with displacement status. The inclusion of prefecture fixed-eﬀects (col. 3) washes
out both eﬀects. Similarly, for on-farm participation rate, whereas a significant and negative eﬀect of
displacement is found in column (1) and (2), suggesting that the fall in hours for migrants is due to
lower on-farm participation, this eﬀect washes out entirely with the inclusion of prefecture fixed-eﬀects in
column (3). Taken together, the main determinants of on-farm labour allocation appear to be household
characteristics and, to a lesser extent, local labour markets. The policy and displacement status do not
seem to have any appreciable eﬀect once those sources of heterogeneity are accounted for.
Overall, once household characteristics and regional disparities are taken into account, these results
indicate no strong systematic diﬀerences in inputs consumption across groups. The results also reassure
us that simultaneously controlling for input consumption, displacement and policy status is not likely to
generate a source of endogeneity in our specifications.
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4.2 Agricultural output
4.2.1 OLS and QR estimates
In the first part of this section, we present the result of regressions of households’ agricultural production
on returnee status, policy status, and a returnee and policy interaction. Our aim is to measure the eﬀect
on returnees’ agricultural output of conflict-induced displacement and of the villagization programme. As
outlined above, because the pilot of the policy was non-randomly distributed across Rwandan prefectures,
we try to achieve an appropriate measure of this parameter by additionally controlling for a large set of
observable household and unobservable prefecture characteristics. In the second part of the section, we
control for production inputs and interact them with all three treatment dummies to measure potential
variations in returns to inputs across groups. Moreover, controlling for production inputs is likely to
purge any further source of bias from our estimates of the eﬀect of displacement and policy. We report
OLS and Quantile Regressions (QR) estimates to account for potential heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects
across ranges of the output distribution.34
First, we regress agricultural output and yield on dummies for returnee status, policy status, and
their interaction, along with household characteristics and prefecture fixed-eﬀects.
Q = α1 + β1X + γ11Re turnee+ γ12 Im idugudu+ γ13Re turnee ∗ Im idugudu+ ηj + ε1 (3)
The upper panel of Table 5 reports the eﬀect of displacement and of the villagization policy, and
their interaction, on agricultural output at the household level. Columns (1), (3), and (5) are computed
on the sample of returnees only, whereas columns (2), (4), and (6) present estimates obtained on the
whole sample. The estimates of the unconditional eﬀects are reported in columns (1) and (2), while the
estimates conditional on exogenous household characteristics and on prefectures are reported in columns
(3) and (4) and columns (5) and (6) respectively.
The measured unconditional eﬀect of displacement is large, positive, and significant, implying an
increase in output of 20 percent for returnees relative to stayers in non-policy areas (col. 2, row 1).
The unconditional eﬀect of the policy on stayers is insignificant, but the coeﬃcient on the displacement-
policy interaction is large, positive and significant and associated with an increase of 30 to 38 percent
(cols. 1, 2, row 3). Columns (3) and (4) show that controlling for household characteristics does not
significantly aﬀect the point estimates. This corroborates the idea that households were not selected into
displacement, nor into policy areas, on the basis of observable characteristics. Columns (5) and (6) show
34The use of Quantile Regression estimation in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis is still debated in the literature. Firpo
(2004) suggests the use of a semi-parametric quantile regression technique. However, we use the least absolute value model
of conditional quantile estimation (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).
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that controlling for prefecture fixed-eﬀects removes all significant eﬀect associated to returnee and policy
status. The result suggests that the eﬀects measured in columns (1)-(4) were entirely attributable to
unobserved heterogeneity across prefectures. Furthermore, it indicates that returnees were more likely
to re-settle in prefectures where their expected agricultural output was higher and the pilot imidugudu
villages were not randomly scattered across Rwanda but were particularly targeted in places where output
was higher.
The results in the lower panel of Table 5 are obtained by replacing agricultural output by yield (output
per hectare) on the left-hand side. This allows us to understand to what extent disparities in land use
might be driving our results. The results present a stark contrast with those obtained in the upper panel
of the table. Indeed, the coeﬃcients on returnee and the policy-returnee are now insignificant, whereas
the coeﬃcient on policy is now large, negative, and significant, implying a fall in output of 26 percent for
returnees and stayers living in policy areas. As was the case for output, with the inclusion of prefecture
fixed-eﬀects (cols. 5, 6), the point estimate falls to zero and becomes insignificant. These findings are in
line with the results on the determinants of input consumption shown in Table 4. Overall, they suggest
that, in order to retrieve an appropriate measure of the eﬀect of displacement and villagization, inputs
and prefecture fixed-eﬀects need to be controlled for.
We now regress agricultural output on dummies for displacement, policy, displacement-policy in-
teraction, agricultural inputs, and their interactions with the three treatment dummies, plus observed
household and unobserved prefecture characteristics. The estimates are computed using OLS and QR.
In formulas,
Q = α2 +Xβ
0
2 + γ21Re turnee+ γ22 Im idugudu+ γ23Re turnee.1
0
n. Im idugudu (4)
+Inputs.δ021 + (1n.Re turnee
0)0.Inputs.δ022 + (1n. Im idugudu
0)0 ∗ Inputs.δ023
+(Re turnee. Im idugudu0).Inputs.δ024 + ηk + ε2,
where Inputs is the matrix of all 3 production inputs: Labour, Seeds, Land, and a dummy for access
to an AES in the village; and ηk is the prefecture fixed-eﬀect.
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of an OLS regression of output on the three treatment
dummies, inputs and their interaction with the three treatment dummies, and the household controls
enumerated above.35 Column (2) shows results from the same specification when prefecture fixed-eﬀects
are added. Columns (3) to (5) present the results of QR respectively at the three quartiles (0.25, 0.50,
0.75), on the same specification as shown in column (2).
35The square of each input consumption variable is also included, to allow for decreasing marginal returns.
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Looking at the coeﬃcients in column (1) associated with inputs (not interacted), we find that they
are all positive and significant, in line with what we would expect. Including prefecture fixed-eﬀects (col.
2) does not have an appreciable eﬀect on the point estimates of return to inputs and their interactions.
The interactions between inputs and the treatment dummies provide some insight on the eﬀect of
displacement and villagization on returnees’ stock of human capital. In column (1), the coeﬃcient on
the interaction between own-farm labour and returnee is positive and significant, implying a increase in
returns to labour for returnees in all areas by 40 percent. That returnees experience higher returns to
labour might suggest that they are more motivated to achieve better livelihoods relative to stayers, all
else equal. Moving to the columns (3) to (5), the coeﬃcient on the interaction between labour and the
returnee-policy dummy is now negative and significant at the 10 percent level in the first quartile, totally
oﬀsetting the increase in returns to labour associated with returnee status (col. 3). Together these results
indicates that living in imidugudu might be associated with a form of discouragement for those producing
at the lower quartile. However, this coeﬃcient is barely significant and fails to pass the test of individual
parameter significance at the conventional levels in all other specifications presented in Table 5.
In column (1), we also find that the coeﬃcient on the interaction between seed consumption and the
returnee-policy dummy is negative and significant, associated with returns to seeds 70 percent lower for
returnees in policy areas relative to all other groups.36 The coeﬃcient on the seed-policy interaction is
positive and significant (at the 1 percent level) at the median of the distribution (col. 4), and the result
is found to be robust to the exclusion of prefecture fixed-eﬀects (results not reported). However, it does
not oﬀset the negative diﬀerential in returns to seeds for returnees in policy areas, which is still large
and now associated with a 55 percent decrease in returns relative to stayers and returnees in non-policy
areas. That returns to seeds are found to be lower exclusively for returnees living in imidugudu suggests
two things. First, displacement might have lowered returnees’ level of agricultural know-how. Indeed,
planting seeds involves relatively more know-how than other agricultural tasks, and it might be that
returns to seeds capture a diﬀerential in the level of agricultural skills across groups. That those lower
returns appear to be significant only in policy areas suggest that returnees living in non-policy areas could
benefit from positive skill spill-overs from the population of stayers. In contrast, those returnees living in
imidugudu seem not to have benefited from such positive externalities, suggesting that the policy might
have had a form of "ghetto eﬀect" on the population of returnees.
The coeﬃcient on the land-returnee-policy interaction is positive and significant in the first two
quartiles of the distribution (cols. 3, 4), associated with an increase in returns respectively by 43 and
36That the coeﬃcient on the interaction between seed consumption and the dummy for returnee is positive and significant
at the 10 percent level is more likely to be a case of data mining, as it is not robust to slight variations in the specification
(col. 3). For instance, the eﬀect disappears with the exclusion of prefecture fixed eﬀects (results not reported).
17
48 percent relative to stayers in all areas and to returnees in non-policy areas. As the data does not
contain any soil quality index at the household level and the policy eﬀect is identified using village-level
variations, we cannot test whether our findings of lower returns to seeds for returnees in policy areas are
the result of systematic variations in soil quality across groups.37 However, this result tends to indicate
that, if anything, the land allocated to returnees in imidugudu villages producing in the first two quartiles
of the distribution is of relatively higher quality. This suggests that the estimated lower returns to seed
truly are the result of variations in the stock of know-how across groups.
Although the coeﬃcient on the dummy for access to an AES is not significant in columns (1) and
(2), the coeﬃcient on its interaction with the returnee-policy dummy is positive and significant, implying
an increase in output by on average 50 percent for returnees living in imidugudu and having access to
an AES in their village. However, very little can be inferred from the data as to the quality of those
AES. It might be that this eﬀect is entirely attributable to a systematic diﬀerence in the quality of the
service provided to the farmers through those AES across policy and non-policy areas. In columns (3) to
(5), the dummy for access to an AES is now positive and significant in the first quartile, associated with
an increase in output by 13 percent. Moreover, the access to an AES-returnee-policy interaction is now
positive and significant only at the median of the distribution. Whereas these results tend to nuance the
conclusion drawn from the OLS regression that villagization enhanced the benefit of an access to an AES
infrastructure for returnees, it demonstrates that access to such service is production-enhancing for all
groups and particularly for those producing low levels of output.
In column (1), the coeﬃcients on all three dummies are now insignificant, suggesting that controlling
for inputs absorbs all the heterogeneity picked up by the treatment dummies in the upper panel of Table
5, columns (1)-(4). In column (2) (and also (3) to (5)38), the coeﬃcient on the dummy for returnee is,
however, now negative and significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that, once diﬀerences in input
consumption are controlled for, along with unobserved prefecture heterogeneity, returnees’ unobserved
heterogeneity is associated with 22 to 32 percent lower output. This large eﬀect indicates that conflict-
induced displacement is associated with a loss in output which was not aﬀected by the pattern of re-
settlement. Moreover, that it does not translate into a diﬀerence in returns to production inputs suggests
that this eﬀect does not result from a loss of human capital, but from sociological pressures.
37Even in the case where we could identify the policy treatment at the household level, including village fixed-eﬀects to
our specification would most likely not solve this issue, as within-village variations in soil quality are known to be quite
large.
38The negative eﬀect associated with returnees’ unobserved heterogeneity is significant at the five percent level in the
first quartile.
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4.2.2 2SLS and IVQR estimates
This subsection presents the eﬀect of displacement, the villagization policy, and the eﬀect of the policy on
the returnees conditional on household characteristics, input consumption, and prefecture fixed-eﬀects,
using instrumental variable estimation (IV-2SLS and IVQR) to control for potential sources of endogeneity
bias in the input-output specification. Whereas the consumptions of on-farm labour participation and
land are considered as "fixed" inputs in the agricultural household literature (Singh et al., 1986), i.e. fairly
inelastic to changes in output over a given period, seed consumption is a flexible input. For instance,
higher ability farmers might be more/less able to save seeds for the next season relative to the lower
ability farmers. Market seed consumption and output would then be negatively/positively correlated,
and our estimates of returns to seeds downward/upward biased. We are concerned that the coeﬃcient on
seeds (and other covariates) as estimated in columns (1) to (5) in Table 5 is inconsistently estimated. In
order to achieve a more appropriate measure of this parameter, we use instrumental variable estimation,
choosing the level of seed consumption aggregated at the village level for our exclusion restriction.39
The use of the aggregate level of a variable as an instrument at the individual level is discussed in the
literature and can be justified on the grounds that there may be some spill-over eﬀects from village seed
consumption to household level demand for seeds (Moﬃtt, 1996, and Currie and Cole, 1993), although
it should be uncorrelated with the individual error term. In the case of household seed consumption, it
is likely that some neighbourhood eﬀects operate at the village level. If the consumption of seeds in a
village is low, supply is also likely to be low, insofar as seed sellers would not find it profitable to visit
the local market. Similarly, a high demand at the village level would imply better chances of finding
seeds on the market.40 Nevertheless, the aggregate demand for seeds is unlikely to be correlated with
the individual error term, as there is arguably no reason why the unexplained component of individual
performance should impact village level seed consumption, unless some natural disaster should occur
within the village.
In practice, we estimate (4), using the predicted values for seeds as obtained from regressing seed
consumption on the aggregate level of seed consumption at the village level, along with all the controls
included in (4). In formulas, 41
39Using distance to market would also be a candidate to serve as IV here. However, almost all villages have a market,
and, since distance to market was surveyed at the village level in kilometers, most have a zero value, which does not allow
us to identify any strong correlation with seed consumption.
40Note that the whether the market for seeds is in excess demand or supply is also likely to aﬀect the price at the village
level. However, under the assumption that, within a same village, all farmers face the same price for seeds, this only
reinforces our identification strategy.
41The F-statistic from the first-stage estimation (not reported) is 23.16, which suggests that the instrument is valid
(Staiger and Stock, 1994).
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Seeds = α3 + ρ3Seeds.jk +WΓ
0
3 + η
0
k + ε3, (5)
where W is the set of controls also included in the second stage and Seeds.jk the seed consumption
at the village level.
Columns (6) and (7) in Table 5 present the 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of displacement and policy
on agricultural output and returns, when seed consumption (and its interactions with the treatment
dummies) is instrumented using (5). The results are very much in line with those obtained with OLS
(cols. 1, 2), except for the coeﬃcients on seeds. Indeed, the coeﬃcient on seed consumption (not
interacted) has increased by 50 percent, although the precision of the estimates does not allow us to tell
them apart. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between seed consumption and the returnee-policy dummy
is now imprecisely estimated and non-significantly diﬀerent from zero. Rather interestingly, these results
suggest that the unobserved eﬀect removed from our estimates through the use of IV on seeds —which
could, for instance, relate to farmer ability— is negatively correlated to seed consumption.
Columns (8) to (10) report the results obtained by estimating the same specification, but using the
method of instrumental variable quantile regression (IVQR) suggested by Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2005a)42 generalised to accommodate one endogenous variable and its three interactions with returnee
status, policy status, and the returnee-policy interaction.43. The results are also very much in line with
those obtained using QR (cols. 3-5) and 2SLS (cols. 6, 7); however, some diﬀerences are worth noting.
Particularly, the coeﬃcient on seed consumption has increased at the median (col. 9), suggesting that
the IV removed some negative correlation between the unobserved eﬀect and seed consumption, but it
has decreased in the first and last quartile (cols. 8, 10), relative to the QR estimation (col. 3, 5). This
indicates that the sign of the correlation between the unobserved eﬀect and seed consumption switches
across quartiles of the distribution of yield. The coeﬃcient on the seed-policy interaction estimated at
the median is now negative and significant at the 10 percent level, a rather large change from the QR
estimation, where the coeﬃcient was positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The interaction
between seeds and the returnee-policy dummy are insignificant in all quartiles, in line with the 2SLS
results. The interaction between land and the returnee-policy dummy is positive and significant at the
10 percent level in the first quartile of the distribution.
42The standard errors are computed, as suggested by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005a) using Powell’s method (1986).
43Other empirical studies that use this method of IVQR are Chernozhukov and Hansen (2001, 2005b), Hausman and
Sidak (2004) , and Januszewski (2004).
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5 Summary and Conclusion
Using the first large household survey data collected after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, this study
attempts to measure the eﬀect of conflict-induced displacement and of a re-settlement policy in post-war
Rwanda. Conflict-induced displacement is used as an exogenous measure of the incidence of conflict to
measure the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide on subsistence household agricultural output. The
imidugudu post-conflict re-settlement and land redistribution policy randomly targeted returnees in post-
war Rwanda and is exploited as a source of exogenous variations in the pattern of re-settlement to measure
the extent to which diﬀerences in patterns of re-settlement can account for diﬀerences in output and in
skill spill-over mechanisms between returnees and stayers. We employ diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, using
stayers as a control group to account for potential systematic heterogeneity across policy and non-policy
areas. We estimate both the average and quartile treatment eﬀects of displacement and villagization on
agricultural output and returns, controlling for production inputs along with a large array of observed
household and unobserved prefecture characteristics. As seed consumption is likely to be endogenous to
the level of agricultural output, we use the level of seed consumption at the village level as an exclusion
restriction. We find that some of the negative correlation between seed consumption and unobserved
eﬀects is removed through this instrumental variable method of estimation, using both 2SLS and IVQR.
First, this study provides several insights on the eﬀects of displacement in post-war Rwanda. We
contribute to the understanding of the spatial sorting of conflict-induced migrants upon return, as we
find that returnees are more likely to re-settle in the "more productive" areas of Rwanda. We also
find that returns to on-farm labour are consistently found to be significantly higher for returnees in
all specifications and across ranges of the distribution of output. This result is consistently observed
in all proposed regression models, on average as well as in all three quartiles of the distribution of
output. One speculative interpretation is that returnees are more motivated in achieving better economic
performance, relative to stayers. Controlling for prefecture heterogeneity and input consumption, the
unobserved heterogeneity associated with conflict-induced displacement is found to have a negative and
significant eﬀect on agricultural output in all areas. As this eﬀect does not translate into diﬀerentials in
returns to input, it tends to suggest that it is the result of negative sociological pressures, as opposed to
a human capital eﬀect. However this eﬀect is not robust to the exclusion of prefecture fixed-eﬀect, and
only significant at the 10 percent level.
Second, this paper contributes to the assessment of the imidugudu policy. Although the unconditional
estimate of the eﬀect of villagization on output and access to inputs is positive and significant, this eﬀect
goes to zero with the inclusion of prefecture fixed-eﬀects. This suggests that, although villagization in
Rwanda might have had, during its pilot years, a positive eﬀect on agricultural output, this positive eﬀect
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is entirely attributable to regional diﬀerences, and, therefore, we contend that extending the programme
nationwide would, most likely, not prove production-enhancing. OLS and QR estimates imply that
returnees in policy areas experience, at all quartiles of the distribution, lower returns to seeds than all
other groups. It suggests that displacement had a negative impact on returnees’ stock of agricultural
know-how. However, this appears to have been counterbalanced, in non-imidugudu areas, by positive
skill spill-overs from stayers to returnees. This tends to corroborate the idea that villagization reduced
skill spill-over flows from stayers to returnees relative to non-programme areas, creating a form of a
"ghetto eﬀect". However, those results are not confirmed when seed consumption is instrumented for.
Finally, most specifications suggest that the programme increased, on average, the positive eﬀect of the
provision of an agricultural extension service on output. This might indicate that villagization increased,
by grouping parcels of land together, the use of more mechanised production techniques. Nevertheless,
our design does not allow us to reject that the agricultural extension services provided in imidugudu
villages might be of higher quality relative to the non-policy areas.
Overall, this study sheds some light on the eﬀects of conflict-induced displacement and of the vil-
lagization policy on household agricultural output in rural Rwanda. We find that returnees experience
higher returns to on-farm labour relative to stayers, possibly implying a higher level of motivation to
increase their economic performance than their stayer counterparts. Moreover, we find that the eﬀect of
villagization, as it was implemented in post-war Rwanda, had no appreciable eﬀect on returnees’ agri-
cultural output, suggesting that extending the programme to the whole of Rwanda is unlikely to prove
production-enhancing.
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the natural log of household agricultural output, by migration
status, and policy regime.
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Figure 2: Histogram and kernel density estimate of year post-1994 returnees left the country.
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Table 1: Policy coverage and proportion of returnees across Rwandan prefectures.
 Communes 
 
without Policy  Communes with Policy 
 Freq. Percent Percent 
of 
Returnees 
 Freq. Percent Percent 
of 
Returnees 
Butare 30 10.03 32.66 10 7.41 21.62 
Byumba 32 10.70 34.60 8 5.93 57.30 
Cyangugu 32 10.70 7.27 7 5.19 20.73 
Gikongoro 37 12.37 14.12 3 2.22 45.45 
Gisenyi 35 11.71 2.75 5 3.70 1.75 
Gitarama 26 8.70 7.00 14 10.37 9.76 
Kibungo 4 1.34 7.78 36 26.67 74.55 
Kibuye 35 11.71 9.27 5 3.70 13.79 
Kigali Ngali 23 7.69 10.61 16 11.85 8.28 
Ruhengeri 33 7.36 14.45 18 13.33 14.55 
Umutara 23 7.69 71.20 13 9.63 73.57 
Total 299 100.00 Mean:  
54.29 
135 100.00 Mean: 
45.71 
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Table 2: Logistic regression at the household level of post-94 returnee status on household characteristics.
Dependent: Returnee 
 
 
 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
No Policy 
(3) 
Policy 
     
Age of the head  -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Avg. age in household  -0.003** -0.004** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Woman head  -0.034 -0.017 -0.056 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.089) 
Widow head  0.063 0.042 0.071 
  (0.044) (0.042) (0.112) 
Size of household  -0.002 -0.004 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
Prop. women in household  0.015 0.030 -0.047 
  (0.033) (0.031) (0.085) 
Prop. children in household  -0.181*** -0.116*** -0.318*** 
  (0.042) (0.039) (0.113) 
Married head  0.055 0.051 0.035 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.111) 
0.103** 0.078* 0.137 Head living in partnership 
 
 
 (0.043) (0.040) (0.117) 
Divorced head  0.063 0.045 0.016 
  (0.068) (0.073) (0.164) 
Separated head  0.079 0.067 0.034 
  (0.053) (0.050) (0.136) 
-1.320*** -0.916*** -2.443*** Prop. members born  
within Rwanda 
 
 
 
 
(0.172) (0.163) (0.384) 
0.019 0.002 0.054 Prop. orphans within 
household 
 
 
 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.056) 
-0.001 -0.001 0.003 Yrs head spent in previous  
residence 
 
 
 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Observations  4907 3402 1505 
Notes: Regression run at the household level. The marginal eﬀects of the logistic estimation are reported. Dependent:
dummy for conflict-induced displacement status at the household level. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
29
Table 3: Logistic regression of the eﬀect of household and commune characteristics on policy status.
Dependent: 
Imidugudu 
 
 
(1) 
Whole 
sample 
(2) 
Stayers
(3) 
Stayers & 
returnees 
before 97 
(4) 
Returnees 
after 97 
only 
 (5) 
All 
Returnees 
0.363 0.841** 0.321 -0.104  -0.310 Prop. children  
(0.436) (0.387) (0.428) (0.261)  (0.253) 
0.020 -0.006 0.016 0.025  0.036* Age HHH  
(0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.021)  (0.020) 
0.419** 0.206 0.358** 0.068  0.101 Woman HHH  
(0.174) (0.129) (0.171) (0.119)  (0.100) 
-0.008 -0.004 -0.008 0.012  0.006 Avg. age within HH  
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.008) 
-0.205 -0.160 -0.138 0.055  -0.090 Prop. with any 
education 
 
(0.223) (0.164) (0.220) (0.142)  (0.128) 
-0.191 -- -0.272 --  -- Returnee  
(0.323)  (0.330)    
0.513** -- 0.552** 0.113  0.144 OCL refugees  
(0.250)  (0.262) (0.111)  (0.097) 
0.021 -- 0.020 --  -- Prop. returnees living 
within the village 
 
(0.231)  (0.224)    
-0.080 -0.092 -0.090 -0.097  -0.136 More arrivals in village 
after 94 
 
(0.125) (0.130) (0.123) (0.184)  (0.161) 
-0.073 -0.073 -0.082 -0.074  -0.197 More departures from 
village aft 94 
 
(0.125) (0.129) (0.122) (0.182)  (0.159) 
-0.087 -0.072 -0.090 -0.139  -0.119 No moves to/from 
village aft 94  
 
(0.133) (0.138) (0.130) (0.205)  (0.173) 
0.021 0.043 0.004 -0.095  -0.101 Owns cattle  
(0.142) (0.120) (0.141) (0.109)  (0.102) 
-0.053 -0.060 -0.052 0.019  0.040 School in village before 
94 
 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.062) (0.110)  (0.090) 
0.036 0.054 0.035 0.157  0.082 Health centre in village 
before 94 
 
 (0.107) (0.116) (0.105) (0.212)  (0.145) 
0.093 0.116 0.099 0.157  0.142 Road through village 
before 94 
 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.070) (0.116)  (0.105) 
-0.035 -0.034 -0.026 -0.204**  -0.080 Water in village before 
94 
 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.087)  (0.069) 
Observations  434 406 426 235  304 
 
Notes: All regressions are estimated at the household level, restricting the sample to returnees and stayers in columns 3
and 4 respectively (prefecture fixed-eﬀects are included - the marginal eﬀects of the logistic estimation are reported).
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Input Consumption: the eﬀects of migration and villagization.
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Land Land Land 
Returnee 0.026 0.068 -0.019 
 (0.046) (0.061) (0.059) 
Imidugudu 0.122* 0.132+ 0.048 
 (0.050) (0.073) (0.069) 
Returnee*imidugudu 0.185* 0.146 0.067 
 (0.080) (0.097) (0.089) 
Other controls  ? ? 
Prefecture Fixed-Effects   ? 
Observations 4907 4907 4907 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.10 
Mean (SD) 0.720 (0.921) -- -- 
  Seeds Seeds Seeds 
Returnee 2.925** 2.196* 1.027 
 (0.780) (1.096) (1.110) 
Imidugudu 1.170* 1.625+ 1.640+ 
 (0.580) (0.933) (0.869) 
Returnee*imidugudu -2.008 -2.541 -1.870 
 (1.269) (1.581) (1.712) 
Other controls  ? ? 
Prefecture Fixed-Effects   ? 
Observations 4907 4907 4907 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.05 
Mean (SD) 3.598 (13.180) -- -- 
  On-farm Labour On-farm Labour On-farm Labour 
Returnee -1.449** -1.126* -0.741 
 (0.416) (0.554) (0.544) 
Imidugudu -0.879* -0.370 -0.536 
 (0.424) (0.589) (0.587) 
Returnee*imidugudu 1.925** 1.721* 0.879 
 (0.706) (0.789) (0.774) 
Other controls  ? ? 
Prefecture Fixed-Effects   ? 
Observations 4907 4907 4907 
R-squared 0.00 0.23 0.25 
Mean (SD) 24.312 (11.373) -- -- 
   On-farm Particip. Rate On-farm Particip. Rate On-farm Particip. Rate 
Returnee -0.031** -0.019+ -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Imidugudu -0.002 0.007 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Returnee*imidugudu -0.011 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Other controls  ? ? 
Prefecture Fixed-Effects   ? 
Observations 4907 4907 4907 
R-squared 0.01 0.16 0.17 
Mean (SE) 0.88 (0.003) -- -- 
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Notes: OLS estimates of the eﬀect returnee status, policy status, and their interaction, on the consumption of agricultural
inputs. The first panel presents the results for land (measured in hectares), the second, annual seed consumption (in 1000
of Rwandan francs), the third, on-farm labour (weekly average per adult member), and the fourth, adult on-farm
participation rate at the household level. Column (1) presents the unconditional treatment eﬀects (no additional controls),
whereas column (2) presents the results conditional on arguably exogenous household characteristics: household head’s
age and its square, household members’ average age, household head’s sex, a dummy for widower head, household size,
number of adults in the household, average educational attainment for members involved in farm production and for
members in charge of the production (years of education, excluding repeated years), average distance to the household’s
cultivated parcels, OCL status ; we further control for prefecture fixed-eﬀects in column (3). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the village level; † significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification.
Variables Returnees 
Only 
 Whole Sample  Returnees  
Only 
 Whole Sample 
 
 Returnees 
Only 
 Whole Sample 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent: Natural  log of  Agricultural  Output     
Returnee --  0.197*  --  0.235*  --  -0.091 
   (0.094)    (0.107)    (0.095) 
Imidugudu 0.377**  0.073  0.315**  0.088  0.047  0.056 
 (0.120)  (0.079)  (0.119)  (0.078)  (0.131)  (0.077) 
Returnee * --  0.303*  --  0.231†  --  0.008 
Imidugudu   (0.126)    (0.123)    (0.123) 
HH controls     ?  ?  ?  ? 
Prefect. FE         ?  ? 
Sample Size 1247  4907  1247  4907  1247  4907 
R-squared 0.02  0.02  0.09  0.09  0.20  0.16 
Dependent: Natural  log of  Agricultural  Yield      
Returnee --  0.016  --  0.040  --  -0.037 
   (0.106)    (0.124)    (0.111) 
Imidugudu -0.331*  -0.265*  -0.344*  -0.260*  -0.129  -0.076 
 (0.144)  (0.130)  (0.144) (0.130)  (0.167)  (0.125) 
Returnee * --  -0.066  --  -0.065  --  -0.008 
Imidugudu   (0.167)    (0.166)    (0.153) 
HH controls     ?  ?  ?  ? 
Prefect. FE         ?  ? 
Sample Size 1247  4907  1247  4907  1247  4907 
R-squared 0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.17  0.15 
Notes: Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the estimates of the villagization policy eﬀect on returnees only; columns (2), (4), and (6) present the impact of
returnee status, policy status, and an interaction on the whole sample. Columns (1) and (2) present the unconditional eﬀects; household controls are included in
columns (3)-(6), and include: household head’s age and its square, household members’ average age, household head’s sex, a dummy for widower head,
household size, number of adults in the household, average educational attainment for members involved in farm production and for members in charge of the
production (years of education, excluding repeated years), average distance to the household’s cultivated parcels, OCL status ; prefecture fixed-eﬀects are
introduced in columns (5) and (6). All regression specifications are estimated using OLS, and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the village level; †
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: QR and IVQR Estimation results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification.
Variable QR IVQR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS Quant. Quant. Quant. 2SLS 2SLS Quant. Quant. Quant.
0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
Returnee -0.055 -0.276† -0.390∗ -0.247† -0.283† -0.294 -0.368† -0.434† -0.506∗ -0.301
(0.165) (0.152) (0.166) (0.134) (0.153) (0.201) (0.193) (0.229) (0.246) (0.243)
Imidugudu 0.011 -0.055 -0.136 0.012 -0.103 0.054 -0.053 -0.089 0.100 -0.096
(0.140) (0.143) (0.148) (0.115) (0.132) (0.158) (0.155) (0.201) (0.143) (0.149)
Returnee*Imidugudu 0.216 0.077 0.407 0.010 0.015 0.303 0.139 0.331 0.040 -0.016
(0.233) (0.233) (0.260) (0.208) (0.241) (0.274) (0.265) (0.322) (0.382) (0.381)
Labour 0.037∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Labour*Returnee 0.015∗ 0.012† 0.015† 0.015∗ 0.014† 0.026∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.019† 0.020∗ 0.017†
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Labour*Imidugudu 0.007 0.007 0.013† 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Labour*Returnee -0.015 -0.012 -0.026† -0.012 -0.010 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 -0.010 -0.011
*Imidugudu (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Seeds 0.041∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.043† 0.049∗ 0.031∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014)
Seeds*Returnee 0.003 0.003 0.008† 0.005 -0.000 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.076 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) (0.064) (0.029)
Seeds*Imidugudu 0.007 0.007† 0.003 0.013∗∗ 0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.000 -0.040† 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.021) (0.018) (0.034) (0.0.24) (0.023)
Seeds*Returnee -0.029∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.022 -0.023 -0.029 0.017 -0.019
*Imidugudu (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042) (0.116) (0.070)
Land 0.437∗∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.475∗∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.433∗∗
(0.049) (0.042) (0.050) (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.048) (0.069) (0.056) (0.052)
Land*Returnee -0.037 -0.057 -0.082 -0.063 0.048 -0.141 -0.091 -0.151 -0.127 -0.039
(0.099) (0.095) (0.094) (0.068) (0.068) (0.106) (0.105) (0.117) (0.116) (0.111)
Continued on next page...
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... table 6 continued
Variable QR IVQR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS Quant. Quant. Quant. 2SLS 2SLS Quant. Quant. Quant.
0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
Land*Imidugudu -0.009 -0.017 -0.026 -0.024 -0.003 0.036 -0.011 -0.036 0.020 -0.022
(0.050) (0.046) (0.061) (0.049) (0.055) (0.063) (0.064) (0.092) (0.076) (0.047)
Land*Returnee 0.168 0.161 0.226† 0.220∗ 0.053 0.190 0.184 0.255† 0.149 0.156
*Imidugudu (0.123) (0.116) (0.126) (0.099) (0.102) (0.133) (0.131) (0.154) (0.169) (0.145)
AES 0.038 0.025 0.126∗ 0.055 -0.018 0.030 0.026 0.107 0.068 -0.010
(0.082) (0.076) (0.063) (0.050) (0.058) (0.082) (0.076) (0.075) (0.056) (0.060)
AES*Returnee -0.016 0.010 0.048 -0.015 -0.046 -0.015 -0.012 0.058 0.063 -0.111
(0.146) (0.131) (0.147) (0.117) (0.135) (0.156) (0.136) (0.194) (0.143) (0.147)
AES*Imidugudu -0.224 -0.090 -0.183 -0.091 -0.010 -0.225 -0.070 -0.135 -0.097 0.011
(0.150) (0.137) (0.122) (0.096) (0.112) (0.151) (0.136) (0.140) (0.108) (0.103)
AES*Returnee 0.503∗ 0.405∗ 0.355 0.318† 0.343 0.525∗ 0.406† 0.301 0.239 0.377†
*Imidugudu (0.214) (0.205) (0.232) (0.185) (0.214) (0.227) (0.209) (0.265) (0.207) (0.199)
Prefecture FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907 4907
Notes: All columns of the table present the estimates of a regression of output on dummies for returnee, villagization and their interaction, production inputs
and their interactions with the 3 treatment dummies. Household controls (cf. Notes to Table 5) are included in all specifications. Prefecture fixed-eﬀects are
included in columns (2), and (7)-(10). Columns (1), (2), report the OLS estimates, whereas columns (3) to (5) report the estimates from QR at the 0.25, 0.50,
and 0.75 quantiles of agricultural output. Columns (6) and (7) presents the results of IV-2SLS estimation of the same specification, instrumenting for seed
consumption; columns (8)-(10) reports the IVQR estimates at the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 quantiles of agricultural output, instrumenting for seed consumption.
Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level in the OLS and IV-2SLS estimations, boostrapped in the QR estimation, and computed using Powell’s
(1986) method in the IVQR estimation. Significance levels: † : 10%, * : 5%, ** : 1%.
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